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philosophers commonly neglect factual matters
relevant to the moral issues they tackle. The second
edition is particularly important for updating the reader
fifteen years on the state of the practices under scrutiny.
AL also serves as an example of the impact moral
philosophy can have on the world. The book was one
of the most significant catalysts for the modem animal
rights movement. And it helped change the world
precisely because it was (1) clearly written, so that
nonphilosophers could learn from it, (2) cogently
argued, so that philosophers might (eventually) come
around to taking the issues seriously, and (3) bursting
with relevant factual information, so that neither
laypersons nor philosophers could continue to hide
behind comfortable misconceptions.
But the very attempt to change the world with
reasoned arguments presupposes the Socratic attitude
that philosophy is for U[t]hinking through, critically
and carefully, what most of us take for granted" (AL,
236). 2 This brings us to a fifth way in which AL shows
what a philosophy book can do: It can offer
intellectually honest criticism of the profession itself.
Singer exposes the widespread failure of moral
philosophers to perform philosophy's critical task,
noting how many leading scholars evade inevitable
conclusions and lower their standards of argumentation when considering the status of animals. For
example, Rawls, confronted with the fact that many

The publication of the second edition of Peter
Singer's Animal Liberation invites us to revisit the
contributions of the philosopher who, more than anyone
else, made the discussion ofanimal ethics intellectually
respectable. Animal Liberation remains important not
only for philosophers and activists working in this area
but also for those interested in what a philosophical
book can do. I say this for five reasons, which
summarize my praise for the book.
First, Animal Liberation (hereafter, 'AL') is
extremely well written. To my mind, no philosopher
writing in the English language today does it better
than Singer. He demonstrates in AL, as always, how
to express philosophical ideas clearly and concisely.!
Second, Singer's arguments are exceedingly cogent.
At times the economy of his expression leads
superficial readers to think he has failed to defend a
point that needs defense (e.g., why sentience is
necessary for moral status), or argued a thesis he has
not (e.g., that the lives of all animals are equally
valuable). A third virtue of AL is its wealth of factual
information relevant to the moral issues confrontedparticularly animal research and factory farming. This
attention to factual detail is instructive because
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enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but
also sufficient for us to say that a being has
interests-at an absolute minimum, an interest
in not suffering [sentence added in this edition]
(AL,7-8).

humans, like animals, lack the sense of justice
necessary (in his view) for the possession of moral
rights, pleads, "I cannot examine the problem here,
but I assume that the account of equality would not be
materially affected" (quoted in AL, 240).3 In the
remainder of this review I will examine the text chapter
by chapter, before criticizing several points of Singer's
argumentation.
Chapter 1 contains the main philosophical argument.
After explaining that underlying the rejection of racism
and sexism is some fundamental moral principle of
equality, Singer gives it the endorsement of the best
work of his profession:

Singer sidesteps the normative debate between the
utilitarianism and rights theorists because settling the
question of rights is unnecessary to the defense of
animal liberation (AL, 8). He goes on to provide a series
of arguments (somewhat updated from the fIrst edition)
against the odd claim that animals have no interests,
though it is noteworthy that he ignores Frey's rather
sophisticated arguments to this conclusion.4 Having
argued that animals feel pain and that there is no
justification for regarding human pain as more
important that animal pain, Singer explores the
implications. In doing so, he emphasizes equal
consideration, which he takes to be virtually
uncontestable, rather than utilitarianism, the specifIc
ethical theory to which he subscribes:

the leading figures in contemporary moral
philosophy have shown a great deal of
agreement in specifying as a fundamental
presupposition of their moral theories some
similar requirement that works to give
everyone's interest equal consideration (AL, 5).
Because many animals have interests, it is possible to
take animals into account in moral decision-making.
And because there is no apparent reason not to take
animals' interests into account---eertainly none that
would exclude all animals while protecting all
humans-animals with interests deserve equal
consideration. In a frequently misunderstood passage,
Singer (quite clearly, I think) explains that the fact of
having interests is conceptually necessary and sufficient
for moral considerability and that this entails a de/acto
criterion of sentience:

So far as this argument is concerned nonhuman
animals and infants and retarded humans are
in the same category; and if we use this
argument to justify experiments on nonhuman
animals we have to ask ourselves whether we
are also prepared to allow experiments on
human infants and retarded adults; and if we
make a distinction between animals and these
humans, on what basis can we do it, other than
a bare-faced-and morally indefensiblepreference for our own species (AL, 16)?

The capacity for suffering--or more strictly,
for suffering and/or enjoyment or happinessis not just another characteristic like the
capacity for language or higher mathematics
.... By saying that we must consider the
interests of all beings with the capacity for
suffering or enjoyment Bentham does not
arbitrarily exclude from consideration any
interests at all-as those who draw the line
with reference to the possession of reason or
language do. The capacity for suffering and
enjoyment is a prerequisite/or having interests
at all .... A stone does not have interests
because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we could
do to it could possibly make any difference to
its welfare. The capacity for suffering and
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Before concluding the chapter, Singer explains that
equal consideration does not entail that all lives are of
equal value, thereby highlighting the important
distinction between equal consideration and equal
treatment. (Because the case for liberating animals from
our major animal-exploiting institutions can be made
by appeal to suffering alone, he considers this issue
secondary.) Equal consideration entails that "beings
who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar
right to life-and mere membership in our own
biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion
for this right" (AL, 19). Unlike S. F. Sapontzis, but like
Tom Regan and James Rachels, Singer ends up with a
view that implies that human lives are ordinarily more
valuable than animal lives:
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While self-awareness, the capacity to think
ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the
future, the capacity for meaningful relations
with others and so on are not relevant to the
question of inflicting pain-since pain is pain
.. , -these capacities are relevant to the
question of taking life. It is not arbitrary to
hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable
of abstract thought, of planning for the future,
ofcomplex acts ofcommunication, and so on,
is more valuable than the life of a being
without these capacities (AL, 20).

Would we be prepared to let thousands of
humans die if they could be saved by a single
experiment on a single animal?
This question is, of course, purely
hypothetical. There has never been and never
could be a single experiment that saved
thousands of lives. The way to respond to this
hypothetical question is to pose another:
Would the experimenters be prepared to carry
out their experiment on a human orphan under
six months old if that were the only way to
save thousands of lives (AL, 81)?

Chapter 2 is a discussion of the use of animals in
research. The wealth of details (including much that
is new to this edition), the doubts cast on the usefulness
of most research, the descriptions of alternatives to
research, and the exposure of the disingenuous way
in which researchers have sold themselves to the
public, all add up to as convincing a case against
animal research as I have read. Singer summarily tells
us that of "the tens of millions of experiments
performed, only a few can possibly be regarded as
contributing to important medical research" (AL, 40).
.His conclusion about psychological research is
particularly scathing:

His utilitarian colors do appear later, however. In
response to the above question, he states that it "will
not do to say 'Never! n, (AL, 85), before elaborating:

what is so disturbing about the examples of
research given above is that despite the suffering
the animals have gone through, the results
obtained, even as reported by the experimenters
themselves, are trivial, obvious, or meaningless.
The conclusions of the experiments cited above
show ... that experimental psychologists have
put a lot of effort into telling us in scientific
jargon what we knew all along, and what we
could have found out in less harmful ways with
little thought-and these experiments were
supposedly more significant that others that did
not get published (AL, 49-50).

This passage fairly clearly establishes Singer's view as
act-utilitarian, a point to which I will return later.
Singer's good sense is revealed in the way in which
he stands back from the institution of animal research
and views it in its proper perspective. He ridicules, for
example, our ineffectual fight against cancer:

I do not believe that it could never be justifiable
to experiment on a brain-damaged human. If
it really were possible to save several lives by
an experiment that would take just one life,
and there were no other way those lives could
be saved, it would be right to do the experiment
But this would be an extremely rare case.
Certainly none of the experiments described
in this chapter could pass the test (AL, 85).

Although tens of thousands of animals have
been forced to inhale tobacco smoke for
months and even years, the proof of the
connection between tobacco use and lung
cancer was based on data from clinical
observations in human beings. The United
States government continues to pour billions
of dollars into research on cancer, while it
also subsidizes the tobacco industry (AL, 88).

Among the details presented are many that are
striking-e.g., the fact that U. S. regulations do not even
cover mice and rats, the most commonly used species.
Later in the chapter Singer confronts the question
of whether the use of research animals is ever justified.
His answer exemplifies once more the prudent strategy
of relying on equal consideration instead of the more
specific and controversial standpoint of utilitarianism:
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At the end of the chapter the big picture is
more painfully-evident:

mor~d

the major health problems of the world
largely continue to exist, not because we do
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for sanitary reasons stipulates that a
slaughtered animal must not fall in the blood
of a previously slaughtered animal ....
[A} nimals being ritually slaughtered in the
United States may be shackled around a rear
leg, hoisted into the air, and then hang, fully
conscious, upside down on the conveyor belt
for between two and five minutes-and
occasionally much longer if something goes
wrong on the "killing line"-before the
slaughterer makes his cut (AL, 154).

not know how to prevent disease and keep
people healthy, but because no one is putting
enough effort and money into doing what we
already know how to do. The diseases that
ravage [the poor around the world] are
diseases that, by and large, we know how to
cure.... It has been estimated that 250,000
children die each week around the world, and
that one quarter of these deaths are by
dehydration caused by diarrhea. A simple
treatment, already known and needing no
animal experimentation, could prevent the
deaths of these children. Those who are
genuinely concerned about improving health
care would probably make a more effective
contribution to human health if they left the
laboratories and saw to it that our existing
stock of medical knowledge reached those
who need it most (AL, 92).

Chapter 4, which concerns the moral issue of
vegetarianism, contains some points of philosophical
and factual interest. Singer begins by arguingprobably (in part) against the position of Frey5-that
while it may be logically consistent to oppose the
present conditions of factory farming while continuing
to eat factory-farmed meat, to do so would be
psychologically very difficult and probably impractical
(AL, 159). For those who, like Frey, wonder whether
one's own boycotting efforts can be known to have
any actual effect on the industry, this is a serious
issue-that is, if one is a utilitarian, for then one
justifies one's actions in terms ofexpected consequences.
Singer rightly notes that "none of the great movements
against oppression and injustice could have existed if
their leaders had made no efforts until they were
assured of success" (AL, 163). (This fact, it seems to
me, provides strong grounds for some type of moral
rule requiring participation in cooperative efforts
needed to defeat serious injustices. It is not entirely
clear that act-utilitarianism vindicates such a rule; if
not, I take that to be a deficiency of act-utilitarianism.)
But Singer also thinks our individual efforts do reduce
demand, thereby saving some animals from suffering
and death, even if our actions are not part of a
collective effort that succeeds in abolishing factory
farming (AL, 163-164).
On the topic of traditional farming, Singernotes that
even these comparatively humane methods involve
"castration, separation of mother and young, breaking
up of social groups, branding, transportation to the
slaughterhouse, and finally slaughter itself' (AL, 160).
Even if animals could be reared without these causes
of suffering, that would be possible only on a small
scale, resulting in vastly higher meat prices and the
impossibility of feeding our huge urban populations
(AL, 160). From a practical standpoint, this obviates

The third chapter, which discusses factory farming,
continues the onslaught of horrifying details depicting
the realities of our treatment of animals. It is updated
from the first edition in several respects. For example,
it discusses Marian Dawkins' recent efforts to use
behavioral evidence to establish rigorously the
preferences of animals presented with certain choices
(AL, 117). It also highlights some progressive
suggestions by the European Parliament on how to
improve the welfare of animals on factory farms (AL,
143), and describes how Sweden is leading the way
with reforms (AL, 144). No description of this chapter
could be complete without offering some sense of the
detailed account it provides of factory farming. Here
is one sampling, which describes the castration of bulls:
Anesthetics are generally not used. The
procedure is to pin the animal down, take a
knife, and slit the scrotum, exposing the
testicles. You then grab each testicle in tum
and pull on it, breaking the cord that attaches
to it; on older animals it may be necessary to
cut the cord (AL, 145).
A second passage describes ritual slaughter in the U. S.:
[What follows] is the result of a combination
of the requirements of ritual slaughter and of
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which
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livestock [as Singer demonstrated earlier], the
upshot of the argument is, after all, that we
ought to become vegetarians (AL, 230)!

the issue of whether the painless killing of animals for
food is justified (AL, 160).
Chapter S, an engaging history of speciesism, will
have to be passed over.
Chapter 6, "Speciesism Today," contains excellent
arguments against common rationalizations for the
exploitation of animals. I include two examples. To
counter the claim that life in a factory farm is preferable
to the dangers awaiting animals in the wild, Singer
argues the following:

AL concludes with Appendices for further reading,
tips on getting by without the products of animal
exploitation, and organizations for animal welfare.
Let me tum at this point to criticisms of the book.
My criticisms may take us deeper into philosophical
theory than Singer wished to go in AL; indeed, Singer
indicates that he does not regard his book as one of
academic philosophy (AL, x). Nevertheless, he also
says, "I have come across no insurmountable objections,
nothing that has led me to think that the simple ethical
arguments on which the book is based are anything but
sound" (AL, xi). This would seem to make it fair game
to subject his "simple arguments" to criticisms at any
level of sophistication.
To begin with, Singer fails to address respectable
criticisms of equal consideration, and has not explained,
in any detail, what equal consideration amounts to. One
challenge, which is widely held and might be called
"the argument from social bondedness," is well stated
by Mary Midgley. In a qualified endorsement of the
idea that the needs of those closest to us have moral
priority over the needs of those less close, she invokes
social bondedness: "The special interests which parents
feel in their own children is not a prejudice, nor is the
tendency which most of us would show to rescue, in a
fire or other emergency, those closest to US."6 By way
of analogy she argues that a preference for our own
species is acceptable but has limits, in no way
justifying the complete dismissal of animals' interests.
Thus, her view accommodates some degree of unequal
consideration.
While, like Singer, I am a champion of equal
consideration, I think far more needs to be said about
this principle to provide a philosophically adequate
defense of it. Midgley's strongest case is priority given
to one's children. A Singerian response would be that
the righUless of such priority is explicable by the greater
long-term efficiency of such partiality, since children
are better cared for if parents focus greater concern on
their own. However, many clear-thinking philosophers
will not be satisfied by this account, believing that the
nature of the relationship of parent to child justifies
preferential treatment. Like W. D. Ross, they will insist
that, even if long-term utility vindicates such
discrimination (so that equal consideration is also

Factory farm animals cannot walk, run,
stretch freely, or be part of a family or herd.
True, many wild animals die from adverse
conditions or are killed by predators; but
animals kept in farms do not live for more than
a fraction of their normal life span either. The
steady supply of food is not an unmitigated
blessing, since it deprives animals of their most
basic natural activity, the search for food. The
result is a life of utter boredom, with nothing
at all to do but lie in a stall and eat (AL, 227).
More likely to be overlooked is the fact that the choice
between living on factory farms and living in the wild
is illusory; abolishing factory farms would not mean
returning animals to their natural habitat. It would
mean that animals would no longer be bred for factory
farms (AL, 227).
Nor can it be argued that animals are better off
factory-farmed than nonexistent; to bring them into
existence with that quality of life is no benefit to them,
"but rather a great harm" (AL, 229). Singer concedes
that animals with no sense of the future might be
benefited by being brought into existence, if they live
on free-range farms and are killed quickly and
painlessly. But even to those who would invoke such
ingenious grounds for selective meat-eating, Singer has
a brilliant retort:
If it were good to bring things into existence
then presumably, other things being equal, we
ought to bring as many humans as possible
into existence too; and if to this we add the
view that human lives are more important than
the lives of animals-a view the flesh-eater
seems sure to accept-then the argument may
be turned on its head .... Since more humans
may be fed if we do not feed our grain to
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being identical to another? An answer is needed to
determine, in some difficult cases, whether certain
interests of different beings must be given equal
consideration. For example, Singer believes that
different lives may have different values; he states that
it "is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware
being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the
future, of complex acts of communication, and so on,
is more valuable than the life of a being without these
capacities" (AL, 20). I assume this means that the life
of a normal adult human and that of a mouse are not to
be given equal consideration, for, if one must choose
between them, one should, on this view, save the human.
The likely response is that they need not be given equal
consideration because what is at stake is not the sametwo different interests, or bundles of interests, are being
compared. Fine, but what determines whether two
interests, or sets of interests, are identical, or sufficiently
similar that equal consideration applies to them? This
issue is important also in considering the interest of not
being confined. Is a normal human's interest in not
being confined such that it should be given equal
consideration to, say, a goldfish's interest is not being
confined? The answers, at least when considering
mammals might have some implications for animal
research. 10
We noted above that Singer is an act-utilitarian.
(This view usually lurks in the background ofAL, since,
again, Singer puts most of his arguments' normative
weight on equal consideration.) This is not the place to
review the many objections lodged against actutilitarianism (AU), but I will briefly mention a few.
As we have seen, it is at least not obvious that AU
vindicates a rule requiring cooperative efforts against
major injustices, or preferential treatment toward one's
own children. Far more obvious is that these should be
vindicated. Moreover, AU seems to require in certain,
perhaps very rare or even hypothetical circumstances,
that ajudge knowingly condemn an innocent person to
death, that one kill an innocent person to save two (not
a thousand) people, that one even rape or torture a child
when, using one's best estimates, doing so would cause
more (not necessarily far more) good than harm.
Defenders of AU have come up with clever
responses to such objections. Sometimes they vindicate
the intuition that a particular action is wrong but argue
thatAU does not endorse it. In some cases it is claimed
that the situation described in the objection will never
occur in the real world. For example, it might be said

vindicated), this fact is simply fortuitous for the
champion of equal consideration; the morality of giving
priority to one's children is not contingent on its
efficiency.?
A second challenge to equal consideration is what I
call the "sui generis view." Justifications for what
counts as a morally relevant characteristic or fact about
a being, the argument goes, have to end somewhere;
logic alone cannot decide what counts as relevant. The
champion of equal consideration and her opponent
simply differ on what facts are relevant. Some examples
will clarify the general point being made about ethical
justification.
Rationalists believe that reasons justifying correct
moral judgments can be provided up to the point at
which it can be shown that denying the judgment would
involve a logical error (or perhaps some other form of
irrationality). Others believe that self-interest is the
only secure anchor for an ethical position. Still others
hold that neither formal rationality nor self-interest is
capable of grounding moral judgments, but that there
are certain objective moral axioms that one either
recognizes or does nOl. 8 For the "sui generis
inegalitarian," being human just is. sui generis, a
morally relevant characteristic that grounds preferential
treatment. The argument for the relevance of being
human goes no further than that; it is no contradiction
to hold the opposite view. While many champions of
equal consideration invoke traits that cut across species
lines (as Singer and I do), no logical demonstration is
ever (or could be) offered that species membership per
se is morally irrelevant. Singer nearly confronts this
view inAL, but ends up saying "any satisfactory defense
of the claim that all and only human beings have
intrinsic dignity [ i.e., deserve greater consideration]
would need to refer to some relevant capacities or
characteristics that only human beings have" (AL, 239).
As a point of philosophical logic, it is false that one
must invoke traits beyond being human to claim that
humans deserve greater consideration. I tentatively
agree that no satisfactory defense of unequal
consideration would fail to adduce further
characteristics, but Singer seems blind to issues that an
adequate defense of equal consideration would treat.
In fact, until recently, Singer apparently thought equal
consideration was a logically necessary feature of moral
language. 9
Singer also fails to explain what equal consideration
amounts to. What is the criterion for one's interests
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that maximizing utility will never justify enormously
unequal distributions of basic goods to different groups
of people, some of whom are left in misery. While
such a situation is imaginable, they say, utilitarians are
only responsible for the real world.
But notice, first, that in such cases the wrongness of
such actions usually seems far more certain than any
ethical theory. So, if AU vindicates the seemingly right
action in the end, that is, as it were, lucky for AU.
Second, would it not be strange if AU were true for our
world but false for worlds that are, after all, not so
different from ours? (Remember that, in many cases,
it is unclear whether AU requires a seemingly wrong
act in our world, or only in other worlds.) The point is
that the efforts to defend AU against objections like
these seem so strained that one wonders why anyone
bothers. What is so great about AU?
Before answering, it is important to note that Singer
does not think moral intuitions have any credibility,
that they are anything but appeals to bias.u (By
"intuition" I mean a judgment that is justified by its
seeming to be correct, whether or not further argument
could justify it.) One might wonder what could
reasonably overrule our strongest reflective moral
convictions (which, by definition, have been examined
. for possible bias).12 Now, surely there is one possible
foundation of morality that, if it does its job, provides
our answer: reason (say, appeal to facts and logic). If
reason can demonstrate that (1) we should be moral
(solving the "is-ought problem") and that (2) we
should follow a particular ethical theory, then there is
no need to appeal to intuition. But rationalism in this
sense has been widely rejected.
However, Singer believes that reason provides a
foundation for ethics and, specifically, AU. His
melaethics is based on the work of R. M. Hare. 13 Singer
is aware of what is at stake: "If [Hare's argument is
right], his work must rank as the most important result
of recent ethics, perhaps even as the culmination of all
Western moral philosophy."14 Hare's famous argument
is based on the claim that moral language is necessarily
prescriptive and universal (the latter feature underlying
equal consideration). I cannot outline his ingenious case
here or take up the major objections against it. (I must
confess, though, that when a philosopher announces the
discovery of a rational foundation for ethics and for a
particular moral theory, I feel almost as I do when I
hear of a "proof' for the existence of God.) But I do
think that some of the objections are successful. 15 In
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fairness to Singer, since I cannot explore objections here,
let me just say that if he is right about Hare's
contribution, then appeals to intuition in ethics are
unwarranted and AU is correct. But if Hare's case
fails--in the absence of a rational demonstration for
the truth of some moral theory-we seem to be left with
little reason to castigate the discriminating use of
intuition in ethics, and just as little reason to accept
AU, with all of its counterintuitive implications.
Notes
t Even greater skill at expressing complex ideas clearly is
demonstrated in his Marx (Oxford University Press, 1980)
and Hegel (Oxford University Press, 1983).
2 An outstanding example of Singer's rising to this task
in found in his "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," in
ThomasA. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, eds., Social Ethics:
Morality and Social Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977),
pp. 315-322. Here Singer argues from modest ethical
premises to the conclusion that our complacent attitudes
about famine are entirely unjustified.

3 In the second edition, however, Singer notes that moral
philosophy has gone a long way toward throwing off its
"ideological blinkers." Anirnalliberation has received a great
deal of academic attention and today many ethics courses
challenge students to think through the issues.

4 R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against
Animals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). Perhaps Singer ignored
Frey's view because he thought it too farfetched or too
complicated to justify entering into.
5 R. G. Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral
Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
6 Animals and Why They Matter (Athens, Georgia:
University of Georgia Press, 1984), p. 102.

7 Ross argues only against the utilitarian account, not
against equal consideration in The Right and the Good
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), ch. 2.
'

8 See Ross' classic defense of a set of self-evident prima
facie duties in The Right and the Good. See also Tom L.
Beauchamp, "Problems in Justifying Research on Anirnals,"
in National Institutes of Health, National Symposium on
Imperatives in Research Animal Use: Scientific Needs and
Animal Welfare (NIH Publication No. 85-2746, 1985), p. 87.

9 See. e.g., Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), pp. 10-11.
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10 I grapple with this surprisingly complex issue in
"Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status" (manuscript
under review).

A Response to
David DeGrazia

11 He does, however, sometimes use them. See, e.g., AL,
228 and 229.

Peter Singer

12 For an attempted refutation of extreme anti-intuitionism,
see my Interests, Intuition, and Moral Status (a 1989
Georgetown University dissertation), ch. 3.

Monash University
My first reaction, on reading David DeGrazia's
review of the second edition of Animal Liberation,
was to applaud, He has located the strengths and
weaknesses of the book with a rare precision. If his
praise is too generous, I shall leave it to others to take
him to task over that. To me, it is particularly pleasing
because it is not the praise of an uncritical admirer.
Nor did my urge to applaud fade away when I turned
to the final, most critical, section of the review, for
here I found DeGrazia's criticisms do indeed point to
aspects of the book's argument that are, at best,
incompletely developed.
DeGrazia is right to say that some of his criticisms
go more deeply into philosophical theory than I wanted
to do in AL. When I came to write the second edition, I
knew that there was now a mass of sophisticated
philosophical literature on the topic that had not existed
when I wrote the fIrst edition. At fIrst I planned to respond
to it, but I soon realized that if I were to do so, I would be
writing a different, and much less readable, book. That
was something I did not want to do. I vaguely intend to
write a comprehensive "reply to my critics" on some
future occasion; meanwhile other projects fill my time,
projects more stimulating and, I think, more fruitful than
the tedious prospect of exposing the flaws in a volley of
objections, some of which are of interest only insofar as
they provide evidence of the lengths to which intelligent
people with philosophical training can go in order to avoid
the need to change their diet.
I do not, however, include in the scope of that last
sentence the difficulties to which DeGrazia points in
the final part of his review. The matters to which he

13 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and
Point (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981).

14 "Reasoning towards Universalizability," in Douglas
Seanor and N. Fotion, oos., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral
Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 147. Actually, in this
article Singer suggests that Hare's case needs some
supplemental reasoning, which he attempts to provide. In doing
so, he notes that "placing a restriction on universalizability does
not seem to involve an inconsistency in any strict logical sense"
(p. 157) (see discussion of the "sui generis view" above); he
thinks instead that such a restriction is arbitrary. While he
imagines a counter to the charge of arbitrariness (pp. 158-159),
the interlocutor is not very resourceful. In any event, Singer's
supplemental argumentation cannot save Hare's theory if the
latter fails for other reasons, as I (and most other moral
philosophers) think.
15 For some

weighty arguments against Hare's view, see R.

B. Brandt, "Act-Utilitarianism and Metaethics,"Thomas Nagel,
'The Foundations of Impartiality," and Bernard Williams, 'The
Structure of Hare's Theory," in Hare and Critics.

DISCUSSION

Winter 1992

51

Between the Species

